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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
DELORES PETERSON, 'I 
Plaintiff and .Appellant, 
-vs.-
1 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case 
No. 7419 
Since we cannot fully agree with the statement of 
facts given by plaintiff in her brief, we shall make our 
own statement. 
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On December 4, 1947 plaintiff filed the following 
letter with the Recorder of Salt Lake City (R. :P· 9-11, 
p. 17-19): 
''Salt Lake City, Utah 
December 2, 1947 
TO: THE MAYOR AND CITY COMMISSION 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
Gentlemen: 
On November 14 1947 on Fourth South 
Street between 8th an'd 9th 'west Streets, I was 
walking on the sidewalk going west toward my 
h?me, this was after dark at night. Along the 
Sl~ewalk Salt Lake City had ·permitted a corner 
tnangle to be broken out of the paved sidewalk 
the full depth of the pavement. It is apparent 
that the break had been there for a considerable 
length of time as the broken out piece could not 
be found in the vicinity. The broken out portion 
of the sidewalk was in a triangular shape extend-
ing approximately one foot in toward the center 
of the sidewalk and one foot along the north side 
of the sidewalk. The walk was dark so that the 
damaged portion thereof could not be seen while 
walking on the sidewalk, and as I walked toward 
my home on the sidewalk, I stepped into the hole 
and my foot sunk into the mud in the bottom of 
the hole over my shoe causing me to fall and as 
a result of the fall my leg was broken in four 
places. · 
By reason of the above, I herewith submit to 
your Honorable Body my bill for damages as a 
result of the fall in the .sum of $7,500.00, and 
re9uest that the same be paid forthwith Your 
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me bringing an action against the municipality 
for the collection of my damages. 
Hereof fail not, or it will be necessary that 
I take due course of law concerning this matter. 
E. LeRoy Shields, 
Attorney for Claimant 
IS/ Dolores Peterson 
Received a copy of the above notice, claim 
and demand, this 4th day of December, 1947. 
/8/ Irma F. Bitner 
Clerk of Salt Lake City 
B. Judges'' 
Plaintiff commenced this action March 3, 1948 ( R. 
p. 1). In her original complaint (R. p. 1) she failed to 
allege that she had filed a claim as required in Section 
15-7-76 U.C.A. 1943. A demurrer to her complaint was 
sustained (R. p. 6). An amended complaint was then 
filed on May 4, 1948 (R. p. 7), to which was attached as 
exhibit "A" the letter above set out (R. p. 11). A de-
murrer to this complaint was sustained (R. p. 14). On 
May 27, 1948 plaintiff filed with the City Recorder an-
other claim (R. p. 17, paragraph 4 Second Amended 
Complaint), bearing date of December 2, 1947, but sub-
scribed and sworn to May 22, 1948 (R. p. 20), amended 
claim exhibit ''B.'' At the to:p of this claim appear the 
words, ''Amended Claim.'' The language of the body 
of this "Amended Claim" is identical with that of the 
first claim, above set out, except that it is attempted to 
be drawn in affidavit form by stating the venue and 
stating it is subscribed and sworn to, and except fur-
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On December 4, 1947 plaintiff filed the following 
letter with the Recorder of Salt Lake City (R. ·P· 9-11, 
p.17-19): 
"Salt Lake City, Utah 
December 2, 1947 
TO: THE MAYOR AND CITY COMMISSION 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
Gentlemen: 
On November 14, 1947, on Fourth South 
Street between 8th and 9th West Streets, I was 
walking on the sidewalk going west toward my 
home, this was after dark at night. Along the 
sidewalk Salt Lake City had :permitted a corner 
triangle to he broken out of the paved sidewalk 
the full depth of the pavement. It is apparent 
that the break had been there for a considerable 
length of time as the broken out piece could not 
be found in the vicinity. The broken out portion 
of the sidewalk was in a triangular shape extend-
ing approximately one foot in toward the center 
of the sidewalk and one foot along the north side 
of the sidewalk. The walk was dark so that the 
damaged portion thereof could not be seen while 
walking on the sidewalk, and as I walked toward 
my home on the sidewalk, I stepped into the hole 
and my foot sunk into the mud in the bottom of 
the hole over my shoe causing me to fall and as 
a result of the fall my leg was broken in four 
places. 
By reason of the above, I herewith submit to 
your Honorable Body my bill for damages as a 
result of the fall in the sum of $7 ,500.00, and 
request that the same be paid forthwith. Your 
failure to comply with this request will necessitate 
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me bringing an action against the municipality 
for the collection of my damages. 
Hereof fail not, or it will be necessary that 
I take due course of law concerning this matter. 
E. LeRoy Shields, 
Attorney for Claimant 
!8/ Dolores Peterson 
Received a copy of the above notice, claim 
and demand, this 4th day of December, 1947. 
/8/ Irma F. Bitner 
Clerk of Salt Lake City 
B. Judges" 
Plaintiff commenced this action March 3, 1948 (R. 
p. 1). In her original complaint (R. p. 1) she failed to 
allege that she had filed a claim as required in Section 
15-7-76 U.C.A. 1943. A demurrer to her complaint was 
sustained (R. p. 6). An amended complaint was then 
filed on May 4, 1948 (R. p. 7), to which was attached as 
exhibit "A" the letter above set out (R. p. 11). A de-
murrer to this complaint was sustained (R. p. 14). On 
May 27, 1948 plaintiff filed with the City Recorder an-
other claim (R. p. 17, paragraph 4 Second Amended 
Complaint), bearing date of December 2, 1947, but sub-
scribed and sworn to May 22, 1948 (R. p. 20), amended 
claim exhibit ''B.'' At the top of this claim appear the 
words, ''Amended Claim.'' The language of the body 
of this "Amended Claim" is identical with that of the 
first claim, above set out, except that it is attempted to 
be drawn in affidavit form by stating the venue and 
stating it is subscribed and sworn to, and except fur-
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ther that the original claim states, "the walk was dark 
so that the damaged portion thereof could not be seen 
while walking on the sidewalk.'' Whereas, the amended 
claim states, ''it was very dark and the damaged por-
tion of the sidewalk could not be seen while walking on 
the sidewalk." (R. p. 19-20) It is apparent that whether 
the walk itself was so dark that the damaged ·portion 
could not be seen or whether the night was dark so that 
the damaged portion could not be seen could very 
readily involve a substantial difference in the issues 
that might be framed, especially on contributory negli-
gence. 
On June 3, 1948 plaintiff filed her second amended 
complaint. This complaint alleges (R. p. 17, paragraph 
4 of complaint) the filing of the claim above quoted on 
December 4, 1947, attached as exhibit "A,., and that 
more than 30 days elapsed after its filing during which 
time the Mayor and City Commission failed and ne-
glected to approve said claim and such failure was tan-
tamount to its refusal to allow such claim. Then it is 
alleged that on May 27, 1948 plaintiff filed her amended 
claim, a copy of which is attached as exhibit ''B.'' 
From the foregoing it is apparent that the claim 
filed with the City Recorder May 27, 1948, more than 
6 months after the accident, is not merely an amend-
ment to the original claim. It was filed nearly 3 months 
after this action was commenced and after the City 
Commission had refused to allow the original claim. It 
did not add a verification to the original claim. If it had 
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the legal effect of amending the original claim, then it 
would be a substitute therefor and should be the clain1 
to be rejected by the City Commission before action 
could be brought thereon. It was in fact a new, separate 
and independent claim, but filed out of time and, there-
fore, a nullity. 
Defendant's demurrer to plaintiff's second amended 
complaint was sustained (R. p. 26) and judgment of 
dismissal entered July 15, 1949 (R. p. 27), it appearing 
to the court that the defect in the complaint could not 
be corrected. 
POINTS IN ISSUE 
It appears to us that there are 3 points in issue in 
this appeal : 
I. Must a claim for damages against the City 
arising out of a defective sidewalk be verified to be 
legally effective. 
II. Can the plaintiff, after commencing her action, 
based upon the filing and rejection of an unverified 
claim, and after the time for filing a claim has expired, 
substitute for the original claim another claim con-
taining a verification. 
III. Is the place of accident designated with suf-
ficient particularity in the claim to meet the require-
ments of Section 15-7-76 U.C.A. 1943 when it merely 
states that, ''on November 14, 1947 on Fourth South 
Street between 8th and 9th West Street I was walking 
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on the sidewalk going west toward my home,'' and 
described the broken portion as being triangular in 
shape, ''extending approximately one foot in towar.:l 
the center of the sidewalk and one foot along the north 
side of the sidewalk.'' 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
A CLAIM FOR DAMAGES AGAINST THE CITY, ARIS-
ING OUT OF A DEFECTIVE SIDEWALK, MUST BE VERI-
FIED TO BE LEGALLY EFFECTIVE UNDER SECTIONS 
15-7-76 AND 15-7-77, U.C.A. 1943. 
This question was settled by this court in the case 
of Hamilton vs. Salt Lake City, 99 U. 362, 106 P. 2d 
1028. In that case a letter was sent to the City Com-
mission with no verification, claiming damages arising 
from falling on a defective sidewalk. The same statu-
tory provisions were involved in that case as are here 
involved. For the convenience of the court we quote 
these provisions. 
Section 15-7-76: 
''Every claim against a city or incorporated 
town for dam·ages or injury, alleged to have been 
caused by the defective, unsafe, dangerous or 
obstructed condition of any street, alley, cross-
walk, sidewalk, culvert or bridge of such city or 
town, or from the negligence of the city or town 
authorities in respect to any such street, alley, 
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crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert or bridge, shall with-
in thirty days after the happening of such injury 
or damage be presented to the board of commis-
sioners or city council of such city, or board of 
trustees of such town, in writing, signed by the 
claimant or by some person authorized to sign 
the san1e, and properly verified, stating the par-
ticular time at which the injury happened, and 
designating and describing the particular place 
in which it occured, and also particularly describ-
ing the cause and circumstances of the injury or 
damages, and stating, if known to claimant, the 
name of the person, firm or corporation, who 
created, brought about or maintained the defect, 
obstruction or condition causing such accident or 
injury, and the nature and probable extent of such 
injury, and the amount of damages claimed on 
account of the same; such notice shall be suffi-
cient in the particulars above specified to enahle 
the officers of such city or town to find the place 
and cause of such injury from the description 
thereof given in the notice itself without extran-
eous inquiry, and no action shall be maintained 
against any city or town for damages or injury 
to person or property, unless it appears that the 
claim for which the action was brought was pre-
sented as aforesaid, and that such governing body 
did not within ninety days thereafter audit and 
allow the same. Every claim, other than claims 
above mentioned, against any city or town must 
be presented, properly itemized or described and 
verified as to correctness by the claimant or his 
agent, to the governing body within one year 
after the last item of such account or clairn 
accrued, and if such acount or claim is not prop-
erly or sufficiently itemized or described or veri-
fied, the governing body may require the same 
to be made more specific as to itemization or 
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description, or to be corrected as to the verifica-
tion thereof.'' 
Section 15-7-77 : 
''It shall be a sufficient bar and answer to 
any action or proceeding against a city or town 
in any court for the collection of any claim men-
tioned' in section 15-7-76, that such claim had not 
been fJ'ff"esented to the governing body of such city 
or town in the manner and within the time speci-
fied in section 15-7-7 6 ; provided, that in case an 
account or claim, otheT than a claim made for 
damages on acount of the unsafe, defective, dan-
gerous or obstructed condition of any street, 
alley, crosswalk, way, sidewalk, culvert or bridge, 
is required by the governing body to be made 
more specific as to itemization or description, or 
to be properly verified, sufficient time shall be 
allowed the claimant to comply with such require-
ment.'' 
In the Hamilton case the court points out that Sec-
tion 15-7-76 describes two types of claims which may 
be filed against the city. One is for defective, unsafe 
or obstructed condition of any street or sidewalk, etc., 
and the second covers all claims other than those just 
mentioned. By the terms of Section 15-7-77 it is a suf-
ficient bar and answer to any :action for the collection 
of any claim under the first part of the statute that a 
claim had not been filed, "in the manner and within the 
time specified in Section 15-7-76." 
The court then says : ''Under the second 
part of the section if the claimant is required by 
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the governing body to be more specific as to 
itemization or description, or if the claim is not 
properly verified, sufficient time shall be allowed 
to comply with such requirements. No provision 
is made for the governing body to make such a 
requirement from a claimant under the first part 
of the section. See Husband Y. Salt Lake City, 
92 Utah 449, 69 P. 2d 491, at page 497. 
"The right to recover damages is statutory, 
it can only be availed of when there has been a 
compliance with the conditions upon which the 
right is conferred. Hurley v. Town of Bingham, 
63 Utah 589, 228 P. 213. Where a right is purely 
statutory and is granted upon conditions, one 
who seeks to enforce the right must by allegation 
and proof bring himself within the conditions. 
Johnson v. City of Glendale, 12 Cal. App. 2d 
389, 55 p. 2d 580. 
''The California District Court of Appeals, 
Second District, had this to say in a case where 
injury had occurred upon a sidewalk and where 
a ''verified claim for damages shall be presented 
in writing and filed with the clerk * * * '' St. Cal. 
1931, p. 2475, Section 1. ''It is the generally 
accepted rule that a municipality and its officers 
are without 1lower to waive compliance with the 
law in such matters. Chapman v. City of Fuller-
ton, 90 Cal. App. 463, 265 P. 1035; Spencer v. 
City of Calipatria, supra (9 Cal. App. 2d 267, 
49 P. 2d 320); Touhey v. City of Decatur, supra 
(175 Ind. 98, 93 N. E. 540, 32 L. R. A., N. S., 350); 
Dechant v. City of Hays, 112 Kan. 729, 212 P. 682 ; 
Berry v. City of Helena, 56 Mont. 122, 182 p. 117. 
The statute does not authorize a waiver nor does 
it provide any substitute for a written verified 
claim. The authorities we have cited quite gener-
ally hold that actual knowledge on the part of 
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officers of municipality of the facts required to be 
stated in the claim does not dispense with the 
claim itself. In view of our holding that the city 
could not be bo111nd by a;ny alleged waiver, con-
sisting as it would of an extension of time for 
filing the claim, it is unnecessary to point out 
the particulars in which the complaint failed to 
show any authority on the part of defendants 
Curl and M~acintyre to represent or act for the 
'City except in the mere matter of the investigation 
of plaintiff's injuries and the cause thereof.'' 
(Italics added.) Johnson v. City of Glendale 
et al., supra (12 Cal. App. 2d 389, 55 P. 2d 583). 
"The above quoted case states in another por-
tion of the opinion: 'The 1931 act requires pre-
sentation of a verified claim to the clerk or secre-
tary of the legislative body of the municipality 
or other governing board within ninety days 
after the accident has occured. It states no excep-
tions, and we are unable to believe that any were 
intended. If there were to be exceptions, they 
s,hould have been stated in the act itself. It is not 
for the courts to create them. It must be pre-
sumed that the Legislature would have made 
disability an excuse for failure to present a claim 
had it been intended to grant that privilege. 
There is nothing novel in this class of legislation. 
Wherever liability of municipalities for negli-
gence is recognized, general l~aws, ·charter pro-
visions, or ordinances will be found imposing 
conditions upon the assertion of claims for dam-
ages, and many such are discussed in the books 
which are far more rigorous than our own sta-
tute.' (Italics added.)" 
In Johnson v. City of Olendale, 12 Cal. App. 2d 389, 
55 P. 2d 583, quoted in the Hamilton case, the plaintiff 
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did not file her claim until 5 n1onths after the accident 
occurred ·while the statute required it to be filed within 
90 days. Plaintiff soug·ht to justify her failure to file 
within the 90 days by alleging her injuries were such 
that she was incapacitated for n1ore than 3 months and 
so could not file "'IYithin the time limit. The court first 
held that the right of recovery was purely statutory 
and compliance with the statute relative to filing a 
claim within a specified ti1ne was mandatory. It then 
said: • '\Yhere a right is purely statutory and is per-
mitted upon conditions, one who seeks to enforce the 
right must by allegation and proof clearly bring him-
self within the conditions.'' 
''The statute does not authorize a waiver nor does 
it provide any substitute for a written verified claim.'' 
Caron vs. Grays Harbor Co1vnty, 18 Wash. 2d. 397, 
139 P. 2d 626. Plaintiff while working as an abstractor 
and looking at records in the county clerk's office was 
injured when she fell from a defective ladder which 
was provided for use in getting to the files. The statute 
governing the filing of claims against the county pro-
vided that the claim must be presented within 60 days 
after the time when such claim or damages accrue, ''all 
such claims must locate and describe the defect whicn 
caused the injury and contain the amount of damages 
claimed ... and be sworn to by the claimant. No action 
shall be maintained for any claim for damages until 
the same has been presented to the board of county com-
missioners and 60 days have elapsed after such :presen-
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tation." The claim filed in this case did not describe the 
defect which caused the defect, merely stating that the 
filing case failed to hold causing the ladder to slip and 
claimant to fall. Neither did the claim state the amount 
of damages claimed. The court held that compliance 
with the claim statute was a condition precedent to the 
maintenance of an action, stating: 
''The inescapable logic of these rules, as 
just stated, when taken together is that substan-
tial ~compliance with the statute is a condition 
precedent to the maintenance of an action for 
damages ag-ainst the municipality; or, expressed 
in another way, the filing of a claim that does not 
substantially comply with the statute has the same 
legal effect as the failure to file any claim at all." 
The court further held that the filing of a proper 
claim could not be waived and that the action of the 
county commissioners in advising claimant that the 
claim was sufficient could not be binding upon the 
county. Among the cases cited is the case of Hamilton 
v. Salt Lake City, supra. 
Spencer v. City of Calipatria, 9 Cal. A:pp. 2d. 267, 
49 P. 2d 320. The statute required the filing of a veri-
fied claim. The claimant alleged that a written claim 
was delivered to the Board of Trustees of defendant :ur'ri 
city setting forth the injuries sustained and how and 
where the same were sustained and demanding compen-
sation for his injuries. It was not verified, however, but 
plaintiffs alleged that they had been led to believe that 
no verification was necessary, and the claim as presented 
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was satisfactory. The city demurred to the complaint, 
which demurrer was sustained without leave to amend. 
The appellate court a:ffinned the ruling, holding that a 
lack of verification could not be waiYed by the city, 
saying: 
'• ~ ot only is the filing of an unverified claim 
not substantial compliance with the statute requir-
ing that a verified claim be filed but in two recent 
cases, it has been held that the provisions of the 
two statutes here in question are mandatory and 
must be complied with in order to lay the foun-
dation for an action. Thompson v. County of 
Los Angeles 140 Cal. App. 73,35 P. 2d 185. Myers 
v. Hopland Union Elementary School District 
of Mendocino County, 44 P. 2d '654. No right to 
bring such an action exists independent of sta-
tute enactment and, in giving such a right, the 
legislature may prescribe the procedure and con-
ditions under which it may be exercised. That 
such a claim must be verified is a reasonable 
provision which should not be held to be ineffect-
ual and meaningless.'' 
Douglas v. City of Los Angeles, 5 Cal. 2d 123, 53 P. 
2d 353. The Supreme Court of California expressly 
affirms the doctrine stated in Spencer v. Calipatria, 
supra, as follows : 
"It must inevitably follow that if a claimant 
in this state is to obtain redress against the city 
for injuries received by reason of the negligent 
acts or omissions of its servants such claimant 
must rest upon the liability imposed by the gen-
eral statute and must conform with the require-
ments of that statute in enforcing that liability. 
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One of the requirements of the general statute 
since 1931 has been that as a prerequisite to suit 
to enforce sueh liability against the city, the 
claimant must have filed with the clerk of 
the legislative body of the city, here the city 
council, a verified claim for damages. St. 1931, 
page 2475; St. 1931 page 2477. In the recent case 
of Spencer v. City of Calipatria (Cal. App.) 49 
P. 2d 320 it was held that the provision of the 
statute in question requiring the filing of a 
verified claim is mandatory, that the city could 
not waive the requirement as a prerequisite to 
suit, and that the filing of an unverified claim was 
ineffectual. A petition for a hearing in this court 
in that case was denied on November 22, 1935. 
The holding therein made is hereby declared to 
be the law in all cases coming within its purview.'' 
Cooper v. Butte County, 17 Cal. App. 2d 43, 61 P. 
2d 516, cited and relied upon in the Hamilton case, re-
iterates the legal propositions stated in California cases 
above referred to. 
The statute involved in the California cases above 
cited, being act 5149, Deerings General Law, 1931, St. 
1931 C. 1167, page 2475, provides as follows: 
"Whenever it is claimed that any person 
has been injured or any person damaged as a 
result of the dangerous or defective condition of 
any public street, highway, building, park, grounds, 
works or property, a verified claim for damages 
shall be presented in writing and filed with the 
clerk or secretary of the legislative body of the 
municipality, county, city and county, or school 
district ,as the case may be, within 90 days after 
such accident has occured. Such claim shall spe-
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cify the name and address of the claimant, the 
date and place of the accident and the extent of 
the injuries or damages received.'' 
Chapman v. Fullerton, 90 Cal. App. 463, 265 P. 1035. 
Here the board of trustees of the city a'Pproved the 
claim and ordered a warrant drawn on the city treasurer 
in payn1ent thereof. The clain1 was not verified and was 
not itemized. The clairn ordinance adopted pursuant to 
statutory authorization provided: 
''X o demand against the city of Fullerton 
shall be allowed by the Board of Trustees . . . . 
unless the claimant shall have filed with the clerk 
his itemized demand in writing, giving the date 
and services rendered, the character of the work 
done and number of days engaged therein .... 
which claims must be verified by affidavit of the 
claimant or some competent person for him.'' etc. 
A taxpayer brought an action to enjoin the officers 
of the city from paying the claim. The court enjoined 
payment of the warrant saying: 
''True, the allowance of claims should be 
sustained in certain instances where it is apparent 
that the claimant has endeavored to itemize the 
same, and as the appellant contends, under some 
circumsta~ces the question of the sufficiency of 
the itemization is one for the board to determine; 
but here as will be noted, no attempt whatever wa~ mad~ to itemize the claim, and, not being 
subscribed or sworn to as required by the ordi-
nance did not constitute even a skeleton claim.'' 
' 
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Nibloak v. Salt Lake City, 100 U. 573, 111 P. 2d 800. 
While this case did not involve the question of failure 
to file a verified claim, the following language from the 
opinion is pertinent: 
"This court is comitted to the doctrine that 
the duty to repair or construct streets within its 
corporate limits is a governmental one and that 
in the absence of a statute no liability devolves 
on a municipality for the defective condition of 
its streets. Hurley vs. Town of Bingham, 63 Utah 
589, 228 P. 2d 213; Hamilton vs. Salt Lake City, 
106 P. 2d 1028. As stated in Hurley vs. Town of 
B'£ng,ham, supra, 'The right to institute an action 
in this class of cases (an injury caused by an 
obstruction) is purely statutory. It did not exist 
at common law, and therefore the conditions 
precedent fixed by the statute which confers the 
right must be complied with, or the action fails." 
One of the conditions fixed by the statute is that 
the claim must be verified. The language of the statute 
is clear on this point. That the verification is an essen-
tial prerequisite to the validity of a claim based upon a 
defective or dangerous street or sidewalk is further 
emphasized when it appears, in other provisions of the 
statute, that the verification may be waived as to all 
other claims. If the verification may not be waived by 
the city, as is held by our court and the other authori-
ties above cited, it must be because verification is an 
essential prerequisite to a legal claim. In other word~, 
an unverified claim has no efficacy. Filing such a claim 
i11 
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does not place any obligation on the part of the city to 
art thereon. It is the same as filing no claim at all. 
POINT II. 
THE PLAINTIFF, AFTER COMMENCING HER AC-
TION, BASED UPON THE FILING AND REJECTION OF 
AN UNVERIFIED CLAIM, AND AFTER THE TIME FOR 
FILING A CLAIM HAS EXPIRED, MAY NOT SUBSTITUTE 
FOR THE ORIGINAL ANOTHER CLAIM CONTAINING A 
VERIFICATION. 
Of course, plaintiff asserts that the filing of the 
second claim constituted an amendment of the first claim 
by merely adding a verification. "\Ve submit, as already 
pointed out, the second claim was not an amended clain1 
but was a separate, independent claim. The first clai111 
had no life or efficacy, lacking a verification. It was 
not amended by adding a verification thereto. An en-
tirely new claim was filed when it appeared :plaintiff 
had no cause of action because of the invalidity of the 
first claim. If the filing of a verified claim is a condition 
precedent to the bringing and maintenance of an action 
against the city, as is clearly held by the authorities 
already cited, that condition may not be supplied months 
after the action is commenced. The cause of action must 
be determined by the status of the conditions as they 
existed when the action is commenced. Furthermore, 
under the claim statute, after the 30 days allowed for 
the filing of the claim had elapsed, the right to file a 
claim has also expired. The right of action on the claim 
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must be measured by the status of the claim as it existed 
at the expiration of the 30-day period. These conclu-
sions are abundantly supported by the authorities cited 
under Point I. In addition we cite the following: 
Berry v. City of Helena, 56 Mont. 122, 182 P. 177. 
Here the statute required filing a notice of injury within 
60 days after the injury, said no tic€' to contain, ''the 
time when and the place where said injury is alleged 
to have occurred.'' The notice filed stated the injury 
occurred January 22, 1916, whereas the evidence showed 
it occurred January 24, 1916. Because of this variance 
the notice was not admitted in evidence. On appeal by 
the plaintiff the court says: 
''Before any liability whatever attaches for 
injuries resulting from defective streets or side-
walks, the city must have received a notice pre-
scribed by section 3289 above. That section is 
not in any sense a statute of limitation. Its pro-
visions cannot be waived for they are intended for 
the benefit of the public whose money must be 
appropriated to the :payment for any damages 
recovered'' .... 
"The statute means just what it says. The 
notice must state the time when the injuries were 
received, and since our Code takes no account 
of the fractional parts of a day in a case of this 
character, the notice must state the day upon 
whi·ch it is claimed that the accident occurred. 
The statute prescribes no particular form of 
notice, and mere informalities would not vitiate 
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of the accident is n1ade a matter of substance, not 
merely a matter of form, and the courts are not 
authorized to change the statute. 
It is not an answer to say that the city 
officials obtained correct information from other 
sources and were not misled. The only right 
which plaintiff can assert against the city is the 
right granted by statute. Compliance with the 
law on her part i8- a necessary prerequisite to her 
right to institute this action, and an appropriate 
allegation of such compliance is an indispensable 
part of the statement of a cause of action. 
X either can appellant invoke the aid of sec-
tion 6585, Revised Codes. The reason for the 
rule there announced arises out of our liberal 
Practice Act ·and the very generous statutes of 
amendment. But while pleadings may be amended 
at any time, even after verdict and judgment 
(Leggat v. Palmer, 39 Mont. 302, 102 Pac. 327), 
the notice required by section 3289 is not subject 
to amendment. At the expiration of the time 
limited by that section, the claimant is bound by 
the notice he has served, and his right to institute 
an action is to be tested by such notice.'' 
Cotriss v. Village of Medina, 124 N. Y. S. 507, Aff. 
206 N. Y. 713, 99 N. E. 1105. The claim statute provided 
that, "all claims for damages or injury alleged to have 
arisen from the defective, unsafe, dangerous obstructed 
condition of any street, highway, bridge, culvert, side-
walk, ... shall within 6 months after the happening of 
such damage or injury, be presented to the board of 
trustees of said village in writing signed by the claim-
ant and properly verified by him, describing the time, 
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place, cause and condition of the damage or injury, 
and the omission to present such claim as aforesaid 
within said time shall be a bar to any action or proceed-
ing against said village." Plaintiff was injured and 
filed a written but unverified claim. The only question 
presented, as the court said, is whether the lack of veri-
fication rendered it a nullity. The court says: 
''The Legislature, in prescribing the form 
of the writing to be presented to the board of 
trustees in order to advise that body of the time, 
place, and cause of the injuries asserted to be 
sustained by the claimant, has definitely required 
that it be "properly verified by him," and that 
requirement is accordingly one of the essential 
elements of the writing. Patterson v. City of 
Brooklyn, 6 App. DiY. 127, 40 N. Y. Supp. 581. 
The verification of a notice of this kind is requir-
ed in most of the charters of villages and cities, 
and is a wise precaution against the presentation 
of fictitious or exaggerated claims. If the claim-
ant verifies a claim which contains material false 
statements intentionally made they may be the 
foundation of an indictment for perjury. If the 
statement is verified, the claimant will be inclined 
to be :precise and accur~ate in setting forth the 
facts which, it is alleged, establish the liability of 
the municipality. 
The language of this charter provision is 
explicit in its declaration that "the omission to 
present such claim as aforesaid within said time 
shall be a bar to ~any action * * * against the 
village." It would seem plain that the service of 
the written notice properly verified by the 
claimant is a condition precedent to the bringing 
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of the action. The statute does not state in so 
many words that the writing must be delivered 
to the board prior to the commencement of the 
action, but as the omission to present is "a bar 
to any ·action or proceeding" the inference is ir-
resistible that its presentation in substantially 
the form prescribed must be made before the 
cause of action n1atures. Certainly a notice such 
as the statute prescribes presented after the com-
plaint is served would be a useless formality. The 
authorities, as I read them, pretty well agree that 
the service of the written statement, in form sub-
stantially complying with the charter regulation, 
is a necessary preliminary to the commencement 
of the action against the municipality.'' 
''The respondent contends that, inasmuch as 
the complaint was verified with the statement an-
nexed and presented within the six months pre-
scribed, the charter provision has been substan-
tially complied with. If the service of the written 
verified statement is a condition precedent to the 
commencement of the action, then the fact of 
such service must be accomplished before the 
summons or complaint is served at all, and must 
be alleged in the complaint.'' 
''The retention of the written statement by 
the board of trustees was not a waiver of the 
omission to verify it. Forsyth v. City of Oswego, 
191 N. Y. 441, 84 N. E. 392, 123 Am. St. Pre. 605; 
Purdy v. City of New York, 193 N. Y. 521, 524, 
86 N. E. 560, et seq. It may be that the omission 
to present the pro:per writing or statement to the 
board did not result in any damage to the de-
fendant. That is not the test. The requirement 
is absolute, and the question of whether injury 
resulted from the failure to comply with the 
explicit mandate of the statute is not open to 
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proof or inquiry. If so, these and similar provi-
sions intended to safeguard municipalities against 
the imposition of unjust claims would be nulli-
fied.'' 
"Nor do I think the contention of the counsel 
for the respondent that the service of the com-
plaint duly verified by the plaintiff, with a copy 
of the written statement attached, meets the pro-
visions of the statute is well founded, inasmuch 
as the service of the written statement is a con-
dition precedent to the bringing of the action. 
The :pith of the statute is that the service of the 
statement must precede the bringing of the action, 
and this essential requirement is not met if a 
copy €>f the notice is annexed to the complaint 
and served with it and comprises the only ser-
vice made. 
The plaintiff apparently has a meritorious 
claim on the merits. It is unfortunate for her 
that she may be defeated in the action by reason 
of the failure to present a statement, properly 
verified, to the trustees of the defendant. TQe 
provision quoted from section 30 of the charter 
of the defendant is similar to those contained in 
many village and city charters. It will not do to 
impair the intended purpose of this provision in 
order to enable the plaintiff to succeed in what 
may be a just claim. These provisions are salu-
tary and readily to be comprehended. Their ef-
fect should not be weakened by decisions of the 
courts made in order to extenuate or help out 
claimants who have omitted to conform to re-
quirements which are indispensable preliminaries 
to the maintenance of an action." 
Balding v. Park Planes Corporation, 70 N. Y. S. 2d 
181. The notice of claim was served on the city within 
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the statutory 6-month period. It described the place of 
the accident as being the southeast corner of Union 
Post Road and East Tremont Avenue. :More than a 
year later. by notice of such, plaintiff nwved for an 
order amending the notice of claim, nunc pro tunc, to 
designate the southwest corner of Union Post Road and 
East Tremont ~-\xenue instead of the southeast corner. 
The decision is stated in the head note as follo\vs: 
''Notice of claim against city for damages for 
injuries sustained because of defective sidewalks 
could not be amended after time for filing of 
claim had expired, to change description of place 
of defect from southeast corner of certain inter-
section to southwest corner.'' 
Rozell v. City of New York, 65 N. Y. S. 2d 864. We 
quote from the decision as follows : 
''Action by plaintiff wife to recover damages 
for personal injuries and by her husband for 
medical expenses and loss of service, the descrip-
tion of the alleged defective part of the sidewalk 
as 'on east side of Troy A venue between Pros-
pect Place and Park Place in borough of Brook-
lyn City and State of New York,' was vague and 
rendered the notice of intention to sue fatally 
defective. 
In consequence and in absence of timely ser-
vice of a valid notice, the right to sue the muni-
cipality terminated 6 months after the happen-
ing of the accident." 
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POINT III. 
THE PLACE OF ACCIDENT IS NOT DESIGNATED 
WITH SUFFICIENT PARTICULARITY IN THE CLAIM TO 
MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 15-7-76, U.C.A. 
1943. 
The only description of the place of the accident 
given in either notice of claim is that it was on Fourth 
South Street between 8th and 9th West Street. The 
defect is described as a triangular hole extending about 
a foot in toward the center of the walk and being one 
foot along the north side of the sidewalk. Plaintiff wa~ 
walking west. It is apparent that the defect may have 
been either in the north sidewalk or the south sidewalk 
and it may have been at any :place between 8th and 9th 
West Streets. Plaintiff cites and relies on the case of 
Connor v. Salt Lake City, 28 Utah 248, 78 P. 479. At 
the time the Connor case was decided the claim statute, 
Section 312, R. S. 1898, provided as follows : 
''All claims against a city or town for dam-
ages or injury alleged to have arisen from the 
defective, unsafe, dangerous, or obstructed con-
dition of any street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, 
culvert, or bridge of such city or town or from 
the negligence of the city or town authorities in 
respect to any such street, alley, crosswalk, side-
walk, culvert, or bridge, shall, within ninety days 
after the hap:pening of such injury or damage, 
be presented to the city council of such city or 
board of trustees of such town in writing, signed 
by the claimant or by some authorized person, 
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and properly verified, describing the time, place, 
cause, and extent of the damage or injury; and 
no action shall be maintained .against any city or 
town as aforesaid for injuries to person or prop-
erty, unless it appears that the claim for which 
the action was brought was presented to the 
council as aforesaid, and that the council or board 
did not, "ithin ninety days thereafter, audit and 
allow the same.'' 
Since that tin1e the statute has been amended re-
quiring ''designating and describing the particular 
place" and that "such notice shall be sufficient in the 
particulars above specified to enable the officers of 
such city or town to find the place and cause of such 
injury from the description thereof given in the notice 
itself without extraneous inquiry, and no action shall 
be maintained ... unless it appears that the claim was 
presented as aforesaid.'' Section 15-7-77 further pro-
vides that it shall be a sufficient bar to an action ~f 
the claim is not presented in the manner prescribed by 
Section 15-7-76. 
The court in the Connor case took the view that in 
determining the sufficiency of the notice it was not 
bound by the terms of the notice alone, but could ex-
amine it in the light of ''extraneous evidence showing 
the situation and surroundings to determine whether it 
sufficiently apprised the municipality of the location 
and nature of the alleged defect." Under the present 
law the court is expressly denied the right to consider 
extraneous evidence. The notice itself must specify the 
particular place so that from such specification alone 
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the city officers can find the place without resort to any 
extraneous evidence. 
The difference in the 1898 statute and the present 
statute is referred to in Sweet v. Salt Lake City, 43 
Utah 306, 134 P. 1167 as follows: 
"From an examination of the Mackay case 
(Mackay v. Salt Lake City, 29 Utah 247, 81 P. 81, 
decided after the Connor case) and the cases 
there cited, it will at once be seen that the statute 
in its present form, and which controls the case 
at bar, is very different from what it was when 
the Mackay case and the Bowman case were de-
cided.'' 
In Berger v. Salt Lake City, 56 Utah 403, 191 P. 233, 
13 A. L. R. 5; this court also refers to the changes in 
the statute made since the Mackay case ·was decided 
saying: 
''After that case was decided, however, the 
statute was amended so as to require the claim-
ant to state the amount of damages that he 
claimed. It would, therefore, be folly to contenci 
that by the amendments to the statutes no change 
was intended or effected.'' 
It is clear, therefore, that the Connor case is with-
out any controlling or even persuasive influence in the 
present case in view of the change made in the statute 
above referred to since the Connor case was decided. 
That the description of the place of the accident in the 
claim here involved is too vague and indefinite to satisfy 
-' 
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the claim statute is supported by the following authori-
ties: 
Village of Dazcson v. Estrop, 243 Ill. App. 55:2. The 
statute required the notice of claim to state • 'the place 
or location where such accident occurred.'' The claiin 
filed for injuries due to a fall on a defective sidewalk 
stated that plaintiff fell by reason of the dangerous con-
dition of said side,valk "running along and at a :point 
to the east of the property owned by one Fannie ~fiers. '' 
The court held the claim fatally defective saying: 
"There is nothing in the notice to indicate 
where, with reference to the sidewalk the prop-
erty of Fannie Miers is situated, nor how far 
east of her property the :point is where the acci-
dent happened. 'To be legally sufficient, a notice 
of this kind must contain a sufficiently definite 
description of the place of the accident to enable 
the interested parties to identify it from the 
notice itself. .All of the specific requirements of 
.statutes of this character are mandatory, and the 
giving of the notice is a condition precedent to 
the right to bring suit, and to recover damages, 
and the giving of the notice must be averred and 
proved by plaintiff to avoid a dismissal of his 
suit'." 
Rozell v. City of New York, 65 N. Y. S. 2d 864. We 
quote as follows from the opinion: 
''The description of the alleged defective p.art 
of the sidewalk as 'on east side of Troy Avenue 
between Prospect Place and Park Place, in the 
borough of Brooklyn, City and State of New 
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York,' was vague and rendered the notice of in-
tention to sue fatally defective. (citing cases) In 
consequence, and in the absence of timely service 
of a valid notice, a right to sue the municipality 
terminated six months after the happening of the 
accident, or in October of 1944. The remedy was 
not revived thereafter, so as to enable :plaintiffs 
to amend the notice, by reason of the enactment 
of laws of 1945, Chapter 694. The right to sue a 
municipality, limited by such conditions precedent 
as the Legislature has seen fit to prescribe can-
not be held to have been revived unless, at least, 
the Legislature unmistakably has so provided.'' 
Swenson v. City of Aurora, 196 Ill. App. 83. The 
statute required the notice of claim to state the place or 
location where such accident occurred. The claim re-
cited that "said hole (in sidewalk) being located upon 
the west side of LaSalle Street between North Avenue 
and Washington Street, and opposite Jennings Semi-
nary, in the City aforesaid." The court says: 
''In the area of sidewalk covered by the de-
scription, there may have been a large number 
of holes. To be legally sufficient, a notice of this 
kind must contain a sufficiently definite descrip-
tion of the place of the accident to enable the 
interested parties to identify it from the notice 
itself." 
The court held that for failure to give notice required 
by law the plaintiff had no cause of action against the 
City. 
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Fan Hovenburg v. City of Ne1i) York, 144 N. Y. S. 
888. The court says: 
''A notice of an injury sustained on a side-
walk which specified that while plaintiff was 
walking on the left hand side of Euclid Avenue 
in the direction of Liberty Street she was in-
jured about 100 feet from Liberty Street is in-
sufficient because not stating where the injury 
occurred; there being two left hand sides of the 
street dependent entirely on the direction in which 
the person is proceeding.'' 
Casey v. City of New York, 217 N.Y. 192, 111 N. E. 
764. The statute required that a notice of intention to 
commence an action be filed giving ''the time and place 
at which the injuries were received within six months 
after the cause of action accrued." The notice stated 
that the accident happened at a "hole in the pavement 
on the public highway at about Washington Street near 
Vestry Street in the Borough of Manhattan in the City 
of New York.'' The court says : 
"This notice is so vague and indefinite as to 
be almost meaningless. Where is 'at about Wash-
ington Street, near Vestry~' It is in Washington 
Street and on which side of Vestry Street, and 
how near to Vestry Street~ The word 'near' 
means 'not distant from,' but the term is wholly 
relative and locates nothing with any degree 
of precision; no one could from the notice locate 
the place with accuracy. 
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The city had no difficulty in finding the spot 
where :plaintiff fell and making its measure-
ments soon after the accident, and, as the first 
purpose of the statute is to enable the city to 
conduct its investigations intelligently, it is urged 
that the notice, vague as it is, is definite enough 
to serve the purpose in this case. The city is 
entitled to know, not alone where the accident 
in fact happened, but also where the injured 
person claims that it happened. The two points 
are not necessarily and invariably identical, and 
the rule requiring a particular location to be 
~stated in the notice should not be greatly relaxed 
merely because the conjectures of the city officials 
as to its meaning prove accurate. Plaintiff has 
failed to prove the service of a proper notice.'' 
POINT IV. 
PLAINTIFF ARGUES THAT THE MAINTENANCE AND 
REPAIR OF STREETS IS A CORPORATE AND NOT :A 
GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION AND HENCE THE CLAIM 
STATUTE SHOULD BE SO LIBERALLY CONSTRUED AS 
TO PERMIT A CLAIM TO BE VERIFIED AT ANY TIME. 
To establish her premise in the foregoing pro:posi-
tion, plaintiff asks this court to overrule its decisions 
in at least three cases, Hurley v. Town of Bingham, 63 
Utah 589, 222 P. 231; Hamilton v. Salt Lake City, 99 
Utah 3:62, 106 P. 2d 1028; and Niblock v. Salt Lake City, 
100 Utah 573, 111 P. 2d 800. In all of these cases this 
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within its corporate limits is a governmental one and 
in the absence of a statute no liability devolves on a 
municipality for the defective condition of its streets." 
The essence of plaintiff's argument is this, the court 
went off half cocked in the Hurley case laying down a 
legal proposition without any legal support; that since 
then this court in the Hamilton and Niblock cases has 
twice perpetuated the error without considering what 
it was doing or the flimsy basis upon which it was rest-
ing its decision. 
And yet counsel admits that the question of whether 
the duty is governmental or corporate is not here in-
volved except as it might have a bearing in giving :1 
liberal construction to the claim statute relative to de-
fective streets and sidewalks. He argues without citing 
any authority, that if the duty to maintain streets is 
proip.rietary then the court can give such a liberal con-
struction to the claim statute as to nullify its provisions 
requiring the filing of a verified claim within 30 days. 
Such position is in direct conflict with the holding of 
this court in at least two cases, Dahl v. Salt Lake City, 
45 Utah 544, 147 P. 622 and Moran v .. Salt Lake City, 53 
Utah 407, 173 P. 702, in both of which cases a proprie-
tary function was involved, but the court nevertheless 
held compliance with the claim statute was a condition 
precedent to a right of action against the city. The 
Dahl case involved damages resulting from negligent 
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aJ 
maintenance of a canal. The Moran case involved negli- J1j 
gence in permitting water to escape from a reservoir. tif1 
It should be remembered that as to claims not in- ~ili1 
volving streets and sidewalks the claim statute, 15-7-76, t~lll 
specifically permits amendment of the claim both as to ~ 
itemization and verification, and imposes the duty upon w& 
the city to call the lack of itemization and verification ~@ 
to the attention of the claimant if it is going to insist ili~l 
upon obedience to those requirements and additional ~11 
time to comply must be given the claimant. There is no 
such liberality evidenced in the statute in respect to 
claims arising from defective streets and sidewalks. 
There the language is definite and conclusive. A veri-
fied claim must be filed within 30 days and no provision 
is made for amendment or for additional time to cure 
defects. 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit that the filing of a verified 
claim within the statutory period of 30 days from the 
date of the accident is a condition precedent to any 
right of action against the city for the consequences of 
such accident. An unverified claim is the same as no 
claim at all. When the time for filing a claim expired, 
and no verified claim was then on file with the city, 
plaintiff's right to sue the city ceased to exist. There-
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after she could not state a cause of action. She could 
not then amend her claim, nor could she breathe ·the 
breath of life into a dead action by a tardy filing of an-
other claim which had no existence when her action was 
commenced. Furthermore, we assert that because of 
plaintiff's failure to describe the place of her accident 
so that the same could be found by resort to the descrip-
tion in the claim, her claim was a nullity. We submit 
that the judgment of the lower court dismissing plain-
tiff's action is right and should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CHRISTENSEN, 
City Attorney 
HOMER HOLMGREN, 
A. PRATT KESLER, 
Assista;nt City Attorneys 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Respondent. 
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